The third section starts out by examining the success Billy Beane has obtained through his new and radical approach to player selection. He was called in front a board of Major League executives to explain how exactly, with one of the lowest payrolls in the entire league, di the Oakland Athletics rank among the best teams in baseball year after year. Billy passes off these questions to sheer luck in order to keep his method to himself. But the proof is there, his ideas are working.
Lewis next explores one of Billy’s greatest schemes, the over-valuation of a closer. Billy himself realizes their value is overhyped, as any normal pitcher put into a save position could have modest success. Coming into the game needing only three outs to win, almost always with a lead, will lead to a favorable outcome more often than not, creating a false sense of importance for the closing position. So Billy exploits this fact, moving a good pitcher into the closing spot, padding his stats, then unloading him for far more than his actual market worth. This is how Billy is able to get the players he wants without a large inflow of cash.
The rest of the chapter once again discusses a drastic new way of statistical analysis, AVM Systems. This approach took every part of a play and separated it into its simplest pieces. What each player did, where a ball was hit, how the fielder reacted, and what kind of pitch were all examples of the minute instances recorded. These fragments were given the name derivatives, no doubt attributed to the fact that the system’s creators were former Wall Street analysts. By interpreting these derivatives, statistical patterns could be found, but more importantly, they were free of the aspect of luck, which no other system to date had success removing. No matter the situation or events prior, this system could tell the likelihood of a run scored after a double, or if two men were on base with one out. Billy’s assistant Paul incorporated an AVM system into the Oakland front office, and Billy used the information to form his strategies and player selections.
Chapter seven focuses on the replacement of a key part of Oakland’s lineup, Jason Giambi. His hitting statistics were phenomenal, but the A’s couldn’t afford to resign him for the amount of money he wanted. So Billy was left to patch together his lineup with the biggest part missing. Giambi led the American League in on-base percentage, leaving a considerable hole to be filled with no money to fill it. So Billy and Paul got together and chose a new idea, instead of finding a big name replacement, pick up a few cheap players whose value adds up to equal Giambi’s.
They determine that the most important stat to focus on was the percentage of pitches outside of the strike zone a player swung at. The lower the number, the more disciplined a hitter, therefore the better a hitter. Through these numbers Billy also came to another conclusion, that the players who lead this statistic were ones he had traded for, while the ones who did poorly were the ones he drafted and tried to teach these ideas. He therefore concluded that hitter is a natural occurrence, and pitch selection can’t be taught. Billy completes his goals of replacing Giambi by signing several decent hitters, one of whom was his own brother, Jeremy. This patchwork works for the moment, but after a few games it is apparent that replacing Jason Giambi is no easy task.
The chapter ends by examining a strange phenomenon, as Lewis describes, the fact that Billy Beane, full of enthusiasm and love for the game, almost never actually watches the team he built play in person. While Lewis and Billy converse within the hallways of the Oakland Coliseum, the Lewis foreshadows the next chapter of the book by introducing its focal point, a recently injured catcher by the name of Scott Hatteberg.
(Section 3 = Chapters Six and Seven, Pages 119 – 161)