Book Report 2

            The second section of Michael Lewis’s Moneyball begins by examining the progression of baseball statistics, and the development of a new way to interpret these statistics, known as sabermetrics. The fourth chapter begins by giving the poor state of baseball statistics in the mid-1970’s. Due to the fact that computers weren’t yet prevalent, baseball statistics weren’t totally accurate and were not nearly as thorough as they are today. This changed due to two separate occurrences, the advancement and availability of computers, and the rising salaries of baseball free-agents.

The advancement of the computer led to a cheaper and more efficient way to store more statistics than anyone before had thought to keep. By having the cheep space to store these piles of information, more and more information started to be collected during baseball games. Bill James used these statistics to publish his first book on baseball statistics, 1977 Baseball Abstract: Featuring 18 Categories of Statistical information That You Just Can’t Find Anywhere Else. In this short book, and the updates he released yearly, Bill James started to not only compile statistics, but chose to also explore them deeper and tried to determine what, if any, insight these numbers could give into how they actually effect a baseball game. Bill James main objection was the focus on the time on a particular statistic, Runs-Batted-In, abbreviated as rbi’s. These numbers were looked upon by baseball managers as indicators on the worth of a hitter, but Bill James realized what they did not, that these statistics didn’t focus on a player’s individual accomplishments, but depended on the work of numerous players, skewing the accuracy of the statistic. James came up with a formula to determine the total runs created y a batter, using only his own statistics, and independent of other players. His formula was:

Runs Created = (Hits + Walks) x Total Bases / (At Bats + Walks)

While this formula wasn’t totally accurate or dependable, it was the first and best formula of its kind, choosing to determine an individual’s impact on team performance. By challenging the status quo and choosing to make his own conclusions, Bill James had changed the way baseball talent could be evaluated, and down the road changed how Billy Beane would choose to form his team.

            The second chapter of the section goes into how Billy took the concepts formed by James, and formed his selections for the 2002 amateur baseball draft. Billy started by focusing on a catcher out of the University of Alabama, Jeremy Brown. Based on the traditions of scouting, Brown was a bust, out of shape and not in baseball form. But Billy saw his value through the four years of hitting statistics he acquired, and knew he was worth more than other’s thought. After his own scouts downplayed Brown’s worth, Billy pointed out that all they had was intuition and opinions, while he has proven results to reach his evaluation. Based on the Athletics’ limited resources, and the competition from other teams, Billy knew he would have to choose his players differently to actually spick and sign the players he wanted. By using James’s theory and focusing on statistics, Billy Beane ended up drafting thirteen players from his original wish list of twenty, an amazingly high number compared to normal results. By choosing players others saw no worth in, and by manipulating other teams through a variety of business tactics, Beane had come out of the draft happier than he could have ever imagined, and had created the foundation for his team’s future.

            This section of the book mainly provides background information, and doesn’t contain any kind of substantial organizational topics. Rather it frames the story for upcoming events, and how these new ideas and practices changed the structure of baseball and statistics forever.

(Section 2 = Chapters 4 & 5, Pages 64 – 119)